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Abstract
After decades of study, automatic face detection and
recognition systems are now accurate and widespread. Nat-
urally, this means users who wish to avoid automatic recog-
nition are becoming less able to do so. Where do we stand
in this cat-and-mouse race? We currently live in a soci-
ety where everyone carries a camera in their pocket. Many
people willfully upload most or all of the pictures they take
to social networks which invest heavily in automatic face
recognition systems. In this setting, is it still possible for
privacy-conscientious users to avoid automatic face detec-
tion and recognition? If so, how? Must evasion techniques
be obvious to be effective, or are there still simple measures
that users can use to protect themselves?
In this work, we find ways to evade face detection on
Facebook, a representative example of a popular social net-
work that uses automatic face detection to enhance their
service. We challenge widely-held beliefs about evading
face detection: do our old techniques such as blurring the
face region or wearing “privacy glasses” still work? We
show that in general, state-of-the-art detectors can often
find faces even if the subject wears occluding clothing or
even if the uploader damages the photo to prevent faces
from being detected.
1. Introduction and background
“Please find all the pictures that my friends took of me.”
Thanks to clever tools from large social networks like Face-
book and Google Photos, it is now possible to answer this
question with a high degree of accuracy. Face recognition
is a de facto flagship example of applied computer vision.
In fact, Facebook’s recognition system is said to approach
human-level accuracy under controlled conditions [20]. Un-
til very recently, it was considered state-of-the-art on the
well-accepted “Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW)” face ver-
ification benchmark, beating dozens of other academic and
commercial systems in the unrestricted setting [10]. Au-
tomatically annotating a photo album with this rich struc-
ture “for free” is a big help when compiling scrapbooks,
Figure 1: Can you see the face in each of these images?
Facebook’s automatic face detector can detect and local-
ize all six faces shown above, even when we try to hide the
face by (A) adding occluding noise, (B) adding distortion,
(C) blurring the face region, or (D) altering image lighting.
Deliberate countermeasures such as (E) wearing a “privacy
visor” with infrared LEDs [24] or (F) wearing “Dazzle”-
style makeup [9] are not always effective—sometimes Face-
book can see through these disguises too. Facebook may not
be able to recognize these faces, but if Facebook can detect
them, it may prompt friends to tag these hard faces and re-
veal their identity.
searching for vacation photos, or catching up on a friend’s
whereabouts. In particular, Facebook’s recently-announced
“Photo Magic” app will use face recognition to help users
quickly share photos among tagged friends [8].
However, this accuracy creates new and interesting
power dynamics that remain largely unexplored because au-
tomatic face recognition technology is actively harmful for
many users. Consider a middle school student fighting In-
ternet bullying, a member of a witness protection program,
a whistleblower hiding from law enforcement, or an activist
protesting their local government. As face recognition sys-
tems grow more accurate, these people lose the ability to
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hide their identity, for better or worse. As we will see—
and as hinted in Fig. 1—Facebook’s face detector can de-
tect (but not necessarily recognize) faces that are difficult
for humans to find, even when steps are taken to prevent de-
tection. These issues stretch beyond Facebook: any accu-
rate biometric system shares similar trade-offs [17]. Many
privacy advocates argue that legitimate uses of automatic
face recognition and similar biometrics should be carefully
considered and closely regulated.
The options are limited for those seeking refuge from au-
tomatic recognition systems. Clearly, the best way to “opt
out” is to never use online social networking tools again,
but it can be difficult and lonesome to stop using Facebook
completely. Further, even if a person does not have an ac-
count on Facebook, their Facebook-using friends can still
“tag” their name in pictures. In these cases, Facebook could
potentially build a recognition model anyway without ex-
posing it to other users. Further, while Facebook provides
tools for users to “opt-out” of automatic tagging, this action
does not stop Facebook from merely hiding recognition re-
sults until law enforcement or a malicious user discovers
how to uncover them. It is always up to the user to take
steps to protect their own privacy.
Another way to evade automatic face recognition is to
damage the photograph so badly that the face can no longer
be automatically recognized or detected. Needless to say,
this is not very practical. If a user wishes to avoid recogni-
tion this way, any friends who might take a picture of her
must promise never to tag her and must always damage all
photos they ever take of her. The incentives are misaligned
because the photographer certainly does not want to dam-
age the photograph and may not understand the subject’s
privacy situation.
These two perspectives–uploader and subject–suggest
complimentary strategies to evade face detection. In this
work, we investigate both angles. Acting as the pho-
tographer, we explore the space of possible synthetic im-
age transformations using various image filters to foil face
detection without degrading image quality. Second, as
the subject, we investigate whether wearing sunglasses,
scarves, hats, or other occluding clothing is an effective way
to avoid face detection. These approaches are interesting to
us for two reasons: first, this work illuminates the accuracy
of Facebook’s face detector today and may uncover sim-
ple techniques that journalists, whistleblowers, and other
privacy-conscious users can use to perturb photos of them-
selves. Second, this study illustrates the gap between auto-
matic and human face detection performance.
Our main contribution is a detailed case study showing
the accuracy of Facebook’s face detector after applying sev-
eral image transformations. What techniques, if any, might
allow users to foil face detection and recognition in photos
they upload? Do existing countermeasures such as censor
bars, “privacy glasses,” and image blurring withstand the
test of time?
Though our results are specific to Facebook’s face de-
tector, we emphasize that they are not the main focus of
our study. Our results could generalize to other commonly-
used face detectors such as the one powering face search in
Google Photos or Snapchat’s Lenses feature.
2. Background
2.1. Face recognition in general
In order to foil face recognition, we must first consider
the various parts of a typical face recognition pipeline. Con-
sider the “Social Network” setting in which a user takes a
picture of their family having lunch in a park. After up-
loading this picture, the social network automatically tags
the people that appear in the user’s picture. This photo is
then shared with their friends. Depending on the user’s
settings, it may automatically become searchable by date,
time, place, or the name of the people who appear in the
photo. How does this complicated process work? Tradi-
tional recognition systems typically use five steps:
• Face detection: Given a raw image, find bounding
boxes for all of the candidate faces within that image.
This is essentially an object detection or tracking prob-
lem [1, 21] and classic approaches use boosting in a
multiple-instance learning framework to find potential
faces. This step is our principal focus.
• Pose estimation: For each candidate face region, esti-
mate the location of several keypoints such as the eyes,
ears, nose, and mouth. This requires a system that is
adept to changes in rotation, scale, translation, light-
ing, expression, and occlusion due to the inherent non-
rigidity of the face and its environment [2, 6].
• Frontalization / normalization: This step is designed
to make the later stages of the pipeline invariant to
pose/illumination/expression differences. To do this,
a normalization step warps or maps the face image
to some canonical reference image. This warp may
be a 2D affine transform, a 2D piece-wise triangular
warp [3], or a 3D camera re-projection [20]. Some
systems additionally try to correct for lighting [22, 23]
and expression [3] differences.
• Feature extraction: Once the face image is canonical-
ized, it is then represented in a well-defined vectorial
representation. This may be as simple as taking pixel
intensity values near the estimated keypoints [15], or
it may be based on convolution features acquired us-
ing deep learning [19, 20] or semantically meaningful
attributes [12].
• Recognition: Once the face image is converted to
some well-formed representation, many face tagging
services compare the face to several stored models
comprising a gallery of the uploader’s friends to find
out who the face is. This step varies quite drastically
between systems. Many face verification systems sim-
ply compare the query face to each and every model in
the gallery, asking “Do these two faces belong to the
same person?” [20]. Other face recognition systems
directly predict the face’s identity using a multiclass
classifier. It is unclear which approach Facebook uses
in production, but they do evaluate one published sys-
tem for comparison to the academic state-of-the-art in
a verification setting [20].
An additional implicit enrollment step is required, in which
the user uploads images of themselves to train the model.
All of the steps of the pipeline are important for recog-
nition success, and any of them may be subverted through
various high-level actions. For example, occluding the face
may cause detection to fail, warping the face in strange
ways may cause pose estimation to fail, and introducing
confusor identities or intentionally mis-tagging one’s own
images may cause the recognition step to incorrectly iden-
tify the face.
One practical way to break recognition is to subvert face
detection. We focus on this step for two reasons: first, auto-
matic recognition systems cannot learn anything about faces
that are impossible to detect. Since people take pictures
without faces all the time, there is nothing strange about
them. Second, if the detection step succeeds, some social
networks may prompt the uploader’s friends to tag the face
even if the recognition fails, allowing one’s friends to “rat
out” the privacy-evading individual. A screenshot of this
prompt taken from Facebook’s Timeline and Tagging Set-
tings page is shown in 2.
2.2. Related work
Many projects consider privacy enhancement tools that
foil face detection by altering the actual face’s appearance
as seen by the imaging sensor. For example, consider the
Privacy Visor designed by Echizen et al. [24]. This device
consists of several high-powered infrared LEDs mounted on
a pair of glasses. When activated, the infrared LEDs wash
out the face when captured with conventional digital cam-
eras, but are invisible to the human eye. The user’s friends
see a person wearing funny glasses, but their cameras only
see specular highlights. Another similar project is Adam
Harvey’s CV Dazzle [9], which is a fashion statement as
much as it is a privacy tool. Rather than wearing glasses,
users can wear make-up or bits of plastic to foil face detec-
tion in a stylish, eye-catching way.
Both of these approaches are practical and attractive be-
cause they allow the individual to take steps to protect their
Figure 2: Facebook can recover if part of the recognition
pipeline fails. For instance, when the detection step finds a
face but the recognition step fails, Facebook can prompt the
uploader’s friends to tag the people in the image, as shown
in this screenshot. However, if the detection step does not
find a face in the image, social networks will not generally
prompt friends to tag the image. This is why we focus on
the face detection step. This screenshot is from Facebook’s
“Timeline and Tagging Settings” page.
own privacy, without having to remind their friends to al-
ter their photos. However, there are two principal draw-
backs with these kinds of approaches: first, approaches
based on pushing the user’s appearance away from the av-
erage face only make the user more iconic. No one wants
to be “that person with the funny glasses/makeup.” Dis-
tinctive faces are easier for people to remember and rec-
ognize [4, 16], which could work against the user’s wishes
to remain anonymous in the physical world. Second, nei-
ther countermeasure is always effective against Facebook’s
face detector. Fig. 1 parts (E) and (F) shows screenshots of
Facebook’s image upload process. Though they may reduce
detection rates, both Privacy Visor and CV Dazzle are inef-
fective for the example images we chose: Facebook detects
the face and asks the user to tag the identity. Granted, Face-
book could not always find the face in either method, but
only a few good detections are necessary to begin building
a recognition model.
Many studies also investigate how image appearance
affects face detection, albeit usually in a “How can we
make face detection better?” sense. For example, Parris
et al. [14] organized a “Face and Eye Detection on Hard
Datasets” challenge at IJCB 2011. Over a dozen commer-
cial and academic contestants submitted face detection en-
tries. The results reveal that state-of-the-art face detectors
generally have trouble recognizing faces that are severely
out-of-focus or small.
Other studies in this area include Scheirer et al.’s “Face
in the Branches” detection task [18]. Scheirer varies the
amount of occlusion of face images and compares detection
accuracy between humans, Google Picasa, and Face.com.
There is still a large gap in performance—human workers
achieve 60% face detection accuracy when as little as 25%
of the face is visible, but Picasa requires 60% of the face to
be visible for similar levels of accuracy. As we will show,
we can exploit this difference to generate pictures that still
look “OK” to humans but are unrecognizable by automatic
systems. Finally, [11] investigates one way of correcting
occluded faces. If a forensic investigator needs a recogni-
tion result from an off-the-shelf recognition system, they
can copy face parts from other faces over the occlusions,
“forcing” the missing face to be detected. This manual cor-
rection step adversely affects recognition performance, but
it demonstrates one potential way to counter the suggestions
in our report.
3. Synthetic experiment design
Facebook testing. Facebook provides an extensive test-
ing framework for app developers on the Facebook plat-
form. For example, we can use Facebook’s app develop-
ment tools to create up to 2,000 sandbox test accounts,
which are exempt from Facebook’s spam blocking and fake
account detection policies. These test users cannot inter-
act with anyone else on the main site, but other than this
difference, test accounts are identical in form and function-
ality to real Facebook users: they can befriend other sand-
box users, post messages, and upload photos to the site, ei-
ther programmatically through the Open Graph API or from
an authenticated browser session. At the time of writing,
Facebook runs the face detection and recognition pipeline
on photos uploaded by sandbox accounts, giving us a sim-
ple way to evaluate Facebook’s recognition pipeline in vivo
without interfering with legitimate users.
After a sandbox user uploads an image, Facebook runs
the face recognition pipeline. Detection results are exposed
to the Javascript image viewer, so we used an authenti-
cated headless browser session to extract these bounding
boxes and potential recognition results of all detected faces.
Though detection results are available instantly, it takes sev-
eral days for Facebook to build a sandbox user’s recognition
model. No confidence score for either detection or recog-
nition seems to be available. We only consider detection
results in this report.
Dataset. We use the PubFig [12] dataset, a very broad
set containing images of 200 celebrities captured under real-
world “in-the-wild” conditions. Each image is tagged with
a single bounding box that describes the person’s face re-
gion within the image. Unfortunately, to avoid copyright in-
fringement, the authors of PubFig only distribute the URLs
of each image and most of them are no longer accessible.
Some URLs now point to incorrectly scaled versions of the
original images or different images completely. All in all,
we were only able to collect 9,195 of the 58,797 images.
From this set, we uniformly sampled a single evaluation set
of 100 images for use in all of our synthetic experiments.
Every image from Pubfig may contain multiple faces
and Facebook may return multiple face bounding boxes
for a given image. However, each image in Pubfig con-
tains only one groundtruth bounding box. An image is
considered a true accept if any of Facebook’s boxes have
an Intersection-over-Union (IoU) score greater than 10%
with the groundtruth.1 This conservative estimate is neces-
sary because Pubfig’s groundtruth bounding boxes are typ-
ically much tighter than those returned from Facebook’s
pipeline. Good facial keypoint extractors can often correct
bad bounding boxes to a limited extent.
Though Pubfig was captured under unconstrained condi-
tions, the faces are easy to detect. In fact, Facebook’s face
detector is generally more accurate than the groundtruth
because of the non-static nature of Pubfig image URLs.
Facebook outputs three “false negatives” in the unfiltered
100-image test set, but two of these three have incorrect
groundtruth due to changes in the image URL since Pub-
fig was published. From manual inspection, Facebook only
actually missed a single face in our evaluation set.
Filters. To study ways of evading Facebook’s face de-
tection, we designed several handcrafted image filters that
cause Facebook’s face detection to fail. We swept each filter
through a set of appropriate parameters to measure perfor-
mance with respect to the amount of distortion that each fil-
ter applies. In total, we uploaded more than 19,000 images
to Facebook sandbox accounts.
4. Selected synthetic results and discussion
Unfortunately, most of our filters substantially degrade
the picture’s quality. As we increase the distortion, humans
and machines alike can no longer see the faces. However,
there are two categories of filters that have interesting per-
formance characteristics: the human-hurting filters that
measurably hurt human detection performance but do not
affect Facebook, and the machine-hurting filters that hurt
Facebook’s detection ability even though the resulting im-
age still looks reasonable. In this section, we describe some
interesting filters from these two categories. The results are
summarized in Tab. 1. All of the other filters are described
in the supplementary material.
4.1. Gaussian noise
One simple filter perturbs each pixel’s intensity by a dis-
tribution drawn from N(0, σ). After perturbation, the dy-
namic range of the image is normalized to lie within 0-255.
This tends to reduce the image’s perceived contrast at high
σ. Example images and results are shown in Fig. 3.
This is one of our most promising machine-hurting fil-
ters: under the highest noise setting, facebook can find less
1The IoU score is defined as the area of the two boxes’ intersection
divided by the area of their union.
Table 1: Summary of our filters, approximate detection ac-
curacies under the strongest settings, and subjective amount
of image degradation.
Filter Accuracy Degradation
Noise 0.22 Low
Blur 0.37 Med
Blur Periocular 0.30 Low
Darken 0.94 High
Censor (Black) 0.21 Med
Censor (White) 0.02 Med
JPEG 0.17 Low
Leopard Spots 0.01 High
Rotation 0.01 High
Swirl 0.34 High
Warp 0.01 High
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Figure 3: Face detection accuracy when applying random
Gaussian noise to each pixel of the test image. Under the
strongest noise settings (σ=50 intensity steps), Facebook’s
face detector finds 20% of the test faces.
than 20% of the faces in the image, but a human has little
trouble detecting faces in the photograph. Our human vi-
sual system is robust to this kind of high-frequency noise,
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Figure 4: Face detection accuracy when drawing white and
black lines through the eyes, varying line thickness. This is
the most effective filter methodology. Completely covering
the periocular region in white successfully hides almost all
faces from Facebook’s face detector. Using a black line is
not as effective.
but Facebook’s detector is not. This presents one easy way
to hide faces that does not affect images very much.
4.2. Lines through eyes
Another machine-hurting filter is to occlude the eyes
by drawing “celebrity censor bars” over the periocular re-
gion. Pubfig does not include eye point locations, so for
this technique, we used the publicly available implemen-
tation of Robust Cascaded Pose Regression (RCPR) [6] to
estimate the locations of the outer and inner edges of the
eyes and manually inspected the results for accuracy. We
then drew a rounded line through these points and varied
its thickness. Example images and performance results are
shown in Fig. 4.
This classic censorship method is still reasonably effec-
tive. If the photographer obscures the periocular region with
a white line, most faces in the dataset are not detected. One
interesting finding is that color matters: white occlusions
are more effective than dark occlusions at hiding the face.
This may be because face detectors can no longer exploit
the discriminative dark shadows in the periocular region as
a detection cue if it is colored white.
4.3. Darkening the image
Within the face detection pipeline, it is common to nor-
malize the contrast of the image to correct pictures that are
too dark or too bright. However, people have a hard time
finding faces in uniformly dark images. This means darken-
ing the image is not an effective way to hide faces – it hurts
human performance without affecting Facebook’s perfor-
mance at all. Example images and face detection results
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Figure 5: Face detection accuracy when darkening the en-
tire image. Facebook performance does not degrade signif-
icantly, even if the image is almost entirely black.
are shown in Fig. 5.
4.4. Leopard spots
One last interesting method to hide faces is by adding
“leopard spots” to the face. This is similar in spirit to
Scheirer et al.’s “ Face in the Branches” test [18]. First,
we generate a mask by thresholding low-frequency 2D sim-
plex noise. We can vary the amount of visible face area
by changing the threshold. Since the size of Pubfig images
varies widely, we rescale the frequency of the noise by the
inter-ocular distance. We then set all masked face pixels to
black. This adds low-frequency noise to the image, making
it harder for machines and humans alike to find the face.
We can further modify this filter by varying the scale of the
noise and blurring the mask to add “softness” to the leopard
spots. Example images and results are shown in Figure 6.
Adding leopard spots is another interesting machine-
hurting filter. Without blur, covering 40% of the face area
with small leopard spots makes almost all of the faces com-
pletely invisible to Facebook’s face detector, but humans
can still see the face area reasonably well. However, some
parameters are not effective. For instance, increasing the
scale of the noise and adding more blur still leaves most
faces detectable.
5. Natural occlusions
The above synthetic experiments help us understand
what kinds of image transformations that Facebook’s face
detector is invariant to, but they require the uploader to
modify the image. If the image was captured unintention-
ally or in a surveillance scenario, it is not possible for the
privacy-conscientious subject to cooperate with the image
uploader. In this section, we investigate steps the subject
themselves can take to obscure their face.
Clear Blurry
Big
Med
Small
Figure 6: Face detection accuracy when adding “leopard
spots” (thresholded simplex noise). This plot varies the oc-
cluded area of the face (plot and top row of examples). We
also varied the scale of the noise (Big, Med, and Small; see
bottom left examples), and we also applied Gaussian blur
to the noise after thresholding (Clear and Blurry; see bot-
tom right examples). The top row of examples are points
along the dark green line and represent the hardest faces
for Facebook to detect.
5.1. Occluding clothing
One simple approach that will not raise suspicion is to
wear occluding clothing such as a scarf, hat, or big sun-
glasses. To measure the effectiveness of these simple eva-
sive measures, we evaluate Facebook’s detection perfor-
mance on two databases. Example images are shown in
Fig. 7.
The classic ARFace dataset [13], now 18 years old, con-
tains carefully captured pictures of 135 subjects obtained
under a controlled laboratory setting. For our setting, we
use 417 “neutral” images (subsets 1, 5, and 6), 417 images
of subjects wearing scarves (subsets 11, 12, 13), and 417
images of subjects with sun glasses (subsets 8, 9, and 10).
We also evaluate performance on the UMB-DB 3D face
dataset [7], which contains 2D and 3D captures of 143 sub-
jects. Each image is tagged with several binary attributes
such as “scarf,” “smile,” “free,” and “occluded.”
Detection results are shown in Tab. 2. Generally, no oc-
cluding clothing is completely effective in hiding the face
from Facebook’s face detector. Wearing a scarf appears to
be the best way to avoid detection, lowering the detection
probability to 88% (ARFace) or 57% (UMB-DB). We hy-
pothesize two reasons for this potential difference: in AR-
Face, the scarves worn by the subjects only cover the mouth
Figure 7: Examples of images appearing in ARFace (left,
middle) and UMB (right). “Scarf” photos in UMB are more
likely to contain scarves that cover the subject’s nose, and
the subject’s eyes are closed more often.
Dataset Number Detection probability
ARFace [13]
Neutral 417 0.995
Wearing scarves 417 0.880
Wearing glasses 417 0.964
UMB-DB [7]
Neutral 883 0.998
Wearing scarf 151 0.570
Occluding haircut 33 0.909
Hat 183 0.945
Table 2: Facebook’s detection probability on two datasets
of face images with naturally-occluding clothing.
region of the face and do not typically cover the nose. In the
UMB set, images with the ‘scarf’ label feature scarves that
typically cover the subject’s nose. Second, subjects in UMB
‘scarf’ images typically close their eyes while ARFace sub-
jects usually keep their eyes open.
5.2. Keypoint occlusion
To gain a more detailed look at which regions of the
face cause the most impact on detection rates, we evalu-
ated Facebook’s detection performance on the “Caltech Oc-
cluded Faces in the Wild” (COFW) [5] training set, which
contains 1345 unconstrained images and keypoint annota-
tions. Each keypoint has a binary “is-occluded?” flag.
Facebook’s face detector detects 97.8% of the faces in
the COFW training set. All 30 missed faces are shown in
Fig. 8. Since this dataset was constructed to feature mostly
occlusions, it is not surprising that all but two of the missed
faces contain heavy occlusions. However, we can get a
sense for what kinds of occlusions are most likely to cause
missed detections by computing detection statistics for each
keypoint.
The color of each keypoint in Fig. 8 shows face detection
probability among images where that keypoint is occluded.
From this figure, we can see that Facebook’s face detector
will only find 60% of faces that have the nose tip occluded.
This is likely because objects that cover the nose tip often
Figure 8: All 30 missed faces in the COFW training set.
P(face detected|keypoint is occluded)
0.64
0.68
0.72
0.76
0.80
0.84
0.88
0.92
0.96
Figure 9: Figure showing the probability that a face is de-
tected given a certain keypoint is occluded. Example: only
61.9% of the faces with covered nose tips are detected.
occlude many more points as well. Further, covering the
mouth region lowers detection probability more than cover-
ing the eye regions. These results, and those in 5.1, seem to
indicate that covering the nose and mouth regions may be a
reasonable way to hide from some face detectors, but more
exploration is necessary.
6. Future work
Thus far, this work focused exclusively on the detection
step. However, we know that it is possible to use the social
network’s recognition system in interesting ways. In future
work, we want to uncover various privacy abuses, such as:
• Using face recognition in social networks to build
an automatic “dragnet.” Since conventional social
networks such as Facebook can typically recognize
anyone on a user’s buddy list, this explicit social link
in fact grants implicit access to that user’s recognition
model. This means that under default privacy settings,
users can use the tools presented here to automatically
recognize their friends in any photos of their choice.
This can be abused as follows: Suppose Louise sets
up a surveillance camera in front of her house. When-
ever the camera detects motion, a script uploads a few
frames of camera footage to Facebook and downloads
classification results. The script sends Louise a text
message when any of her friends arrive. In this way,
Louise gains the ability to know whenever anyone on
her buddy list visited her house. This is interesting be-
cause Louise does not need to collect any kind of train-
ing set. Facebook automatically and implicitly pro-
vides her with the ability to query near-perfect, up-to-
date models of many of her friends, giving her a state-
of-the-art recognition framework without the hassle of
enrollment or parameter validation. Her friends’ mod-
els improve over time as they continue to use the web-
site and upload more pictures.
• Misleading recognition results. Is it possible to poi-
son one’s model to classify someone else? If Sara up-
loads several pictures of Mason to her profile and tags
herself as Mason’s face, social network face recogni-
tion systems might become confused and begin to au-
tomatically tag pictures of Mason as Sara. This would
notify Sara whenever any of her friends are in photos
of Mason.
7. Conclusion
Though we only evaluated Facebook’s face detector, our
results could apply to any social medium that uses auto-
matic face recognition technology. Our goal is not to com-
plain about Facebook’s default policy settings or lament
the impending death of privacy. Instead, we wish to start
a discussion about the unintended power dynamics that
these systems create when they cannot be avoided. Af-
ter all, avoiding automatic face detection and recognition
is becoming more difficult as talented engineers search for
ways to improve these systems. Real-world countermea-
sures such as the privacy visor or CV Dazzle are not always
effective and may even make the subject more recognizable
in the real world.
In this work, we studied image transformation tech-
niques that help a privacy-conscious individual avoid being
automatically identified. However, there are several practi-
cal problems with the methods we outline. First, the photo
uploader, not the individual, must remember to use the im-
age perturbation techniques. Second, many of these tech-
niques make the image look worse to humans. However,
these techniques illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of
state-of-the-art face detectors used in common social net-
work platforms. We now know that Facebook has little trou-
ble detecting faces in low-light conditions, but occlusions
and noise are still difficult to find. If a privacy-seeking indi-
vidual wishes to develop more ways of avoiding automatic
detection, building from these observations could be a good
first start.
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